The phenomenon of violent political action has figured prominently in key events of the past year.
These events include the second anniversary of the 25 January popular uprising that toppled the regime of Hosni Mubarak, the 22 March demonstrations in front of Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Moqattam, and, importantly, the expected protests on 30 June marking the first anniversary of the swearing in of President Mohamed Morsi.
With that, the use of street demonstrations – which quickly become violent – as a means of protest and political expression has become commonplace in post-revolution Egypt.
Along with the rise in violence has been a corresponding rise in a commonly-heard demand being chanted by protesters: the call for the overthrow of President Morsi and the regime dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood.
This is the main goal of the Tamarod, or 'Rebel,' campaign, which seeks to gather 15 million signatures before 30 June in support of holding early presidential elections.
This call to overthrow the president appeared for the first time since the fall of Mubarak during the protests triggered by Morsi's controversial constitutional declaration of 22 November, which gave the head of state absolute powers. In the face of violent public demonstrations, Morsi retracted the declaration, but the damage was already done.
The liberal and leftist opposition have since seized every opportunity to denounce the authoritarian and anti-democratic drift by Morsi and the Brotherhood.
The protesters are far from homogeneous. Apart from the thugs, the vandals and those hired by certain forces and personalities to create disorder for their political interests, there are also a growing number of protesters who openly advocate the use of violence against the regime in order to achieve their demands.
They say they have lost faith in the ability of peaceful demonstrations to achieve the objectives of the revolution. In their eyes, this revolution was usurped by the Islamist movement for the benefit of one group, the Muslim Brotherhood, without regard for the ideals that defined the popular uprising against Mubarak's regime.
These protesters are now determined to respond to police violence with equal violence, and, more significantly, to put pressure on the regime through acts of sabotage.
We saw protesters blocking roads and subway lines, disrupting public services, and attacking public buildings and police stations, not to mention the attacks against the offices of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. This violence is not limited to Cairo and other major cities, but also affects the provinces.
These acts show the continuing collapse of the state's authority. This was clear on the 28 January 2011 'Friday of Anger,' when riot police of the Ministry of Interior were defeated by demonstrators.
More than two years after the fall of Mubarak, the state has not yet restored its authority and still lacks credibility on the part of the public.
One symptom of this collapsing state authority is the appearance of groups who, taking the administration of justice into their own hands, began to use force against their rivals.
An example of this is the 'Black Bloc,' formed as a reaction to the violent intervention of Muslim Brotherhood supporters against Morsi's opponents during a sit-in in front of the presidential palace following the 22 November constitutional declaration.
This increase in violence is explained partly by the fact that the January 25 uprising created rising expectations among large segments of the population, especially among those who rebelled against the old regime.
These expectations did not account for the harsh reality in the country, namely the current economic crisis, and many are now disappointed by the lack of achievements since the fall of Mubarak. They are eager to see their daily lives change.
Their grievances are two-fold: economic (deterioration of living conditions) and political (constraints on civil liberties and democracy). In their mind, the current regime dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood should be held especially accountable for failing to fulfil the goals of the revolution and improve their daily lives because its leader is the first democratically-elected president.
However, since Morsi's inauguration, the division between Egyptians has never been wider, and this gap continues to widen between the ruling regime and the opposition.
These two main camps suffer from mutual distrust and seem cloistered in their own logic, accusing each other of all evil. The Muslim Brotherhood is partial to conspiracy theories and often casts the blame on a "misleading" media and the forces of "counter-revolution," meaning the remnants of the former regime.
For its part, the liberal opposition, a minority that cannot defeat Islamists in elections, regularly calls for popular mobilisations. These mobilisations, which are hard to control, often disintegrate into violence.
The opposition's criticisms are based on the fact that the new regime has devoted most of its time and energy to establishing the authority of the Muslim Brotherhood. Instead, the opposition would like to see the regime engage with the various political forces for the sake of addressing the major economic and political problems facing the country.
The Brotherhood bears the primary responsibility for the deterioration of the political climate. Today, it stands virtually alone: the ultraconservative Salafist Nour Party, the second-largest political force and a natural ally of the FJP, has endorsed the request of the liberal National Salvation Front to refuse, among other things, the domination of the Muslim Brotherhood in state institutions and political life.
