The Libya issue is very complicated, beyond local players. This article may not be enough to discuss all aspects of the problem, but what is certain is that we should not quarrel over the parameters of Egypt’s national security. This is a red line irrespective of the type of regime in power. It is also unacceptable to dispute supporting our soldiers when they are on the battlefield.
Nonetheless, no one has carte blanche, especially when it comes to blood and bullets. We all know through bitter experience that historic mistakes cannot be fixed retroactively.
At difficult times, honesty requires us to review the parameters that dictate the Egyptian position on developments in Libya, especially after the heinous crime against Egyptian citizens there. First and foremost is the need for Egypt to avoid becoming militarily embroiled in any of the explosive Arab battlefields. Egypt must also move diplomatically as part of Libya’s neighbours (especially with Algeria) to coordinate positions and action. It must also receive a clear and public request for help from the legitimate Libyan government. Meanwhile, efforts must be made to issue a comprehensive Arab League resolution as legal and political cover for Egyptian action. It would be helpful if Egyptian diplomacy succeeded in clinching agreement on joint Arab action against terrorists, which at the same time would contribute to creating a political framework for a solution in Libya.
Taking steps in New York is important to have cover from the UN Security Council, although one must be careful this does not lead to making the Libyan issue an international one. We understand the depth of problems that internationalisation causes in the Arab world; in Libya, NATO destroyed its capabilities as a state and left it prey to a gang of bandits. Although I have very low expectations from the Security Council because of the US’s clear objection to any military action against terrorist bases in Libya, under a false pretense, Egypt’s insistence on revealing the agendas of all regional and international players to world opinion is especially important.
On 30 August 2014, I published an article in Al-Ahram newspaper titled “The legitimacy of intervening in Libya,” discussing the legal foundations that give Egypt the right to intervene in Libya based on the UN Charter and international law, including international humanitarian law. I explained that Article 51 of the Charter gives member states the right to take appropriate unilateral or collective measures to defend themselves, although there are several restrictions on this right. I also discussed the responsibility to protect as a new principle in international law which is common in jurisprudence and application since the end of the Cold War. It was used as an argument for NATO operations in Yugoslavia to protect the people of Kosovo. I concluded that the legal context of the issue does not give legitimacy to military intervention in Libya without meeting certain conditions and taking into consideration political, humanitarian and economic relations between the people of Egypt and Libya, so that intervention does not become a strategic mistake.
The guns have fired, the jets took to the skies, and the rallying call rose in the media. The proper political position that patriotism dictates is absolute support for our soldiers in the battlefield, support that must be offered with eyes wide open, fully aware of shortcomings and minefields.
Patriotic duty also requires us to assert once again what has been repeated in all history books and wars: war is too important to be left to the generals. Therefore, the decision of war and peace is primarily a political one. If the political leadership takes a decision to go to war, the generals go to work operating the killing machine, and they must stop it as soon as they are given the order to stop by the political leadership. This does not disparage the generals, but it is a necessary division of labour. There is not enough room here to give examples in history of lost wars run by generals.
Perhaps this is why the Egyptian legislators who wrote our new constitution insisted on hinging the decision to go to war on special conditions. It is taken after the approval of two thirds of parliament, because such a serious decision cannot be left to the whims or fantasies of one person or a handful of people.
It is more serious than appeasing feelings of anger or revenge, but is a collection of intricate calculations that should not be subject to the vulgarities of a media that of late is pouring fuel on the fire and harassing the public to mobilise. Neither should the decision be subject to blackmail by some politicians who are trying to manipulate current conditions to stifle public freedoms and restore the conditions predating the 25 January revolution.
I believe that we are currently not managing a crisis but drafting an entry strategy to find solutions for national security challenges. This also requires an exit strategy after achieving all or most of our goals. In fact, the accuracy and professionalism of the exit strategy is more important than the entry strategy.
During similar times, Gamal Abdel Nasser said that our slogan should be, "One hand builds and another carries arms." I believe this simple phrase is deeply philosophical and relevant to dealing with today’s reality. The hand carrying the weapon will remain steady as long as the hand building is also sturdy, free, productive and unconstrained. Construction, in all its meanings, and especially construction of the human being, is the foundation of any victory we aspire.
