Some winning candidates have considered the results of the first round of parliamentary elections a “slap” in the face of the January 25 Revolution.
This further denotes what the media, backed by business moguls and security services, has been saying all along: what happened in Egypt in January 2011 was a conspiracy carried out by a group of young traitors financed by the West.
The media and quasi-politicians consider June 30 to be the real revolution and a coup against January 25. Yet, by arguing so they offer revolutionary legitimacy for the Muslim Brotherhood by putting them in the same basket as the 30 million Egyptians who protested across Egypt for the removal of Hosni Mubarak's regime.
Parliamentary elections have proven to be a battle both for and against the January 25 Revolution, in which those against it came out to eliminate those for it.
The fault in parliamentary elections is the fault of the electoral system drafted under the interim president by law experts tailoring it to match the political mood of the time. It is also the fault of the Constitution's creators, who left the electoral process for executive powers to formulate, creating the first time in modern history that legislation was formed by the executive branch.
In the few sessions that I attended of the "fake dialogue" the government held with political parties and forces about the electoral law, I asked the prime minister and incumbent ministers, more than once, a clear question that they never answered. The question was: what kind of Parliament do the Egyptians want after two revolutions?
Let us first take a look at the Parliament intended for Egypt that will supervise the executive branch, because this will determine the legal framework that will govern it.
The first revolution was against tyranny and selling the country to corrupt businessmen under Mubarak's reign. The second was against the fascist authority of the Muslim Brotherhood looking to disintegrate the country's unity and security in the name of religion.
In light of this, do we want a Parliament that consolidates those goals or one that prevents Egyptians from claiming their rights? Do we want a Parliament that brings the change that the people revolted for or one that brings stability, leaving change to come at the behest of the ruler?
It seems as though while people were pondering one thing, the rulers were contriving something else.
The Constitution is the biggest obstacle for the new regime and the forces affected by the January 25 Revolution. While it was described as having been written with good intentions, it is ambitious and its implementation needs time.
For the first time since 1952 we have a Constitution that ensures a balance between the executive and legislative branches, whereby the president can dissolve the Parliament after a referendum, though he must obtain the Parliament’s approval of the government he forms. The Parliament may withdraw confidence from the president with special procedures and after a referendum approved by a majority, instead of revolting against him, as was the case with Mohamed Morsi.
In other words, the Constitution is acting on behalf of the revolution and is not leaving matters to spontaneous reactions. (The German Constitution, for example, gives the people the right to use force in case the regime violates it).
But this Constitution does not comply with the political mood of the new regime or with the forces that have special interests, such as to take revenge from the revolution.
They and others drafted the law on Parliament in such a way so as to allow an amendment to the Constitution that excludes political parties, especially the revolutionary ones, from Parliament, and render them unable to form a coalition in the face of the executive branch.
Strangely enough, the previous law strengthened political parties, as half of parliamentary seats were allocated to collective party lists and the other half to individual runners. Under the law, nascent revolutionary parties succeeded in winning a significant representation in Parliament.
Although the 2014 Constitution stipulates that the political system is based on a multi-party system, and despite the fact that it gives the majority party the authority to form the government, the new law on Parliament was formed to give a wider field to individual runners in the elections at the detriment of the political parties. Add to this certain satellite channels that kept attacking the parties, calling them “politically impotent”.
This was the political objective of the post-June 30 regime and these were its legal tools. We have repeatedly warned, during discussions about the draft law, that it would open the door for money power, for tribal fanaticism and for the symbols of the disbanded National Democratic Party to take control of the next Parliament, but nobody listened, or they did but pretended not to hear.
Hastily rushing to impose a de facto legislature has become an end in and of itself so as to produce a chained Parliament. Hundreds of laws were issued, of which some were in violation of the “necessary” considerations stipulated in Article 156 of the Constitution. Jurists who were paid off, a phenomenon that has plagued Egypt, justified them.
Whether they listened but did not understand or they deliberately or inadvertently did not listen or understand, the result was as follows:
The people found out the truth. Unlike previous turnout rates, the majority did not go out to participate in the elections.
Turnout after the revolution was 50 percent in the referendum on the Constitution, presidential elections and parliamentary elections. This time it dropped to 20 percent in the first round of the parliamentary elections, not to mention the fact that 10 percent of votes were deemed invalid.
Will such a Parliament truly represent the people of Egypt?
Strangely enough, the head of the High Election Committee averts to compare this rate with the previous, and chooses to brag about it in the media in comparison with the elections of the Shura Council and the People’s Assembly that was boycotted in 2005.
The objective was to arrive at a futile Parliament unable to exercise its constitutional powers. This was achieved through the following:
1. Excluding the lists that do not bode applause for the regime, such as the “Egypt’s Awakening” list. The committee did not carry out a court ruling allowing the candidates of that list to undergo a second medical examination (they had paid thousands of pounds for the first) and only gave them three days to finish the medical re-examination, which the same committee had previously said was not necessary. It has also rejected a recommendation not to let the candidates bear additional costs, although it was in her power to do so because her decisions are binding for all state entities.
Consequently, the For the Love of Egypt list, which was formed by the security services, won all the seats in the first round. It is also expected to win the second round because these are elections void of competition.
The supporters of political loyalty have defeated the supporters of the Constitution and linking power and accountability.
2. Money power and political thuggery, whereby the parties of the businessmen, who have a clandestine agreement with the regime, formed parties that nobody had heard of and inundated them with money to help them win. Their program is total support for the regime, with no need for control by Parliament.
3. The entry of National Democratic Party symbols, who spoiled the lives of Egyptians for 30 years, either through hiding behind the parties of the business moguls or by hiding in the For the Love of Egypt list. Eighty-three of them won in the first round, which represents one-third of the winners. All they want is immunity in return for obedience, which is quite suitable.
4. Although there are some good candidates, whose voice would be hardly heard in Parliament, there are many others who lost against thuggery and insolence.
Will this Parliament truly represent Egyptians?
I call on Egyptians to impose their will in the second round, otherwise they will pay a price.
