Corruption was not the only problem of the Mubarak regime. Favouritism empowered select businessmen and undermined the state’s independence from them. This bias is being remanufactured after the revolution, since prevalent discourse limits the problems of the past to the corruption of individuals.
Those in power choose which segment of society to favour and to what degree; a state’s economic bias is inevitable. What some view as a decision to withdraw from the economic domain is in fact a move to empower businessmen, because separating politics from economics is a modern arbitrary division that is only found in capitalist systems.
Second, because the state should decide the boundaries of private ownership and how to manage the tools of production and the public good, withdrawing and allowing the private sector to own these tools and advantages — that were once public property — means empowering this sector.
Prejudice towards businessmen is apparent in the separation of production and distribution; talking about “encouraging investment” separately from talking about “the rights of workers,” and thus advancing the former at the expense of the latter. Creating “an environment that attracts investment” through constraining workers’ movements, banning existing parties on a class basis, endorsing legislation that curtails union freedoms, etc, in return for encouraging charity work and development that allows the regime to continue meeting some needs without overhauling its structure.
Favouring businessmen is also evident when they are allowed to participate in decision making by transitioning from government management where decisions are taken by democratically legitimate bodies and carried out by the bureaucracy, into a system where businessmen partake in decision making and executing decisions even though they are not elected. The dividing line between them and elected powers fades and they become the class closest to the regime’s heart, participating in drafting domestic and foreign policies.
These economic biases were a mainstay of the Mubarak regime, especially in later years where the state’s independence from businessmen dwindled and completely disappeared. This favouritism manifested itself in the formation of the Policies Committee which included a large number of businessmen, then in consecutive governments that directly included an increasing number of businessmen appointed to executive offices.
The state’s bias was also obvious in privatisation policies and investment incentives that at the same time restrained workers’ movements by banning independent unions and using security agencies to control official unions, and promoting charity work and development activities that involved the two sons of the ousted president. A new elite was formed, replacing the traditional ruling class (composed of various social strata) with businessmen.
This prejudice created social injustice and wealth became concentrated in the hands of a few, while impoverishment increased and the state’s role in providing basic services retreated, such as in education, healthcare, housing (government spending in these areas was flagrant evidence of this bias). These injustices became expressed in the demands of revolutionaries, who chanted for “bread” and “social justice.”
The nebulous new regime, however, has not yet attempted to emancipate itself from these biases. It still allows businessmen to participate in governance in a way that cannot be democratically justified. One such manifestation is allowing several businessmen to accompany the president on his trip to China, and signs that they are participating in drafting foreign and economic policies.
One businessman described it as “unprecedented cooperation” with Cabinet ministers and “promises by ministers to remove all obstacles facing the private sector,” to create an investment-friendly environment. Such promises — in some democracies that protect the rights of the working class — would fall under the definition of corruption.
Another indicator is creating a committee for continuous contact between the president and businessmen, which gives them a privilege over other segments in society and constitutes undemocratic participation in governance.
This is not the only sign of class bias by the state; there are other aspects, including some corrupt businessmen who benefited from their relationship with the Mubarak regime going on the trip. This reveals a readiness to reconcile with them because of the need to close ranks in facing challenges that are portrayed as challenges facing the nation, but are in fact challenges to this favouritism through growing social protests. This requires businessmen to stand together to protect their classist interests.
Class bias is also apparent in the terminology of political discourse that has mutated definitions. “Societal consensus” that players on the political scene (rulers and opposition) were seeking so intently in the Constituent Assembly aimed — as it emerged during debate — to find enough representation of this business class from across the political spectrum. Meanwhile, debate over representing the impoverished and marginalised in the assembly was peripheral.
“Citizenship” that guarantees equal rights and duties focused on obtaining these rights irrespective of gender, race or faith (all variations within the class of businessmen), but debate rarely explored how to obtain equal rights for the impoverished. Thus, declarations of “national unity” are made by people of all political, religious and racial hues — albeit they are all key figures in society.
Bias is also apparent in accepting the IMF loan, because of its political implications (world powers agreeing to work with the new regime that would require an economic “partnership”), and the economic aspects (encouraging investment and continuing “structural reforms” that impoverished Egyptian over the past two decades). This makes the loan, in the eyes of the state and its businessmen allies, “necessary,” and therefore the state seeks it and ignores reforming economic structures to make them fairer. Not even peripheral reforms, such as restructuring wages and taxes, address the core of the state’s bias, but rather aim to alleviate any outward appearance of prejudice.
The persistence of this favouritism to businessmen means that the social injustice that the revolution rose up against continues until today; the economy, as a means of managing resources in a manner that achieves the best interests of the group, is too important to be left to economists alone.
The people must have a say and the course should only be decided by those who have democratic legitimacy. Leaving the matter in the hands of those who are neither politicians nor economists, but merchants and businessmen whose economic views are based on the concept of a “corporation” not “state,” is reckless in its disregard for the nation’s future. It leaves the door wide open to the squandering of national wealth
