The soundtracks of 007 movies 'Live and Let Die' and 'Skyfall' had been particularly useful in understanding the relations between Egypt's minister of defence General Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi and the Muslim Brothers’ President Morsi, which is significant to grasp the country’s deepening political and economic crisis.
The on-going clashes that are taking place in Egypt since the commemoration of the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution in 25 January 2013, have unveiled the basis of the military’s strategy towards the Muslim Brothers. For political analysts the position of the military establishment in Egypt and its relation to President Morsi had been a perplexing matter, especially after his removal of the long serving minister of defence Field Marshal Tantawi in August 2012.
Some have argued that for the first time in Egypt’s history, the military establishment has subordinated to a civilian president that is democratically elected, regardless of his affiliation to the Muslim Brothers. As time passes, and as the political crisis intensifies, the disparity between the military and the presidency becomes evident and harder to ignore.
While the presidency struggles to survive, the military watches the Muslim Brothers’ decline with amusement. General Al-Sisi, a religiously pious military leader deeply respected within the officer corps, has tailored the military’s strategy towards President Morsi and the Muslim Brothers. Such strategy is perfectly manifested in Sir Paul McCartney’s James Bond song ‘Live and Let Die’.
Al-Sisi’s strategy is informed by the SCAF’s daunting experience in power for a year and half, where it had been harshly criticised for its inability to handle the transitional period. Egypt’s new defence minister made the restoration of the military’s ‘prestige’ and appealing image his prime goal. He appointed an army spokesperson, who became responsible for answering media inquiries and reflecting the army’s professionalism and discipline. Through his Facebook page that has almost 100K subscribers, the army spokesperson publishes news, pictures and videos of the army’s achievements in enhancing Egypt’s security and stability, with almost no mention of President Morsi, reflecting the military’s indifference towards the political leadership.
The Muslim Brotherhood, however, has contributed to the development of the military’s ‘live and let die’ strategy that although was appealing at the beginning, turned into the President worst nightmare. The Muslim Brothers’ constant fear and distrust towards the military had made them suspicious of military leaders’ actions.
This was evident when clashes erupted in front of the presidential palace last December, in the aftermath of mass protests against Morsi’s constitutional decree that granted him unlimited powers. General Al-Sisi called all political forces for a dialogue to solve the political deadlock that the country was suffering from. The presidency was outraged with the military’s intervention in the political process and pressed the ministry of defence to withdraw its initiative.
On the day of the proposed gathering, the ministry of defence had to call off the meeting. While the presidency celebrated its power over the military establishment, pushing it to withdraw its invitation, the army chief remained silent, waiting to reap the rewards of thepresidency’s floundering. The Muslim Brothers sought to appease the military by granting it more privileges in the new constitution in order to guarantee its neutrality.
According to the new constitution, the minister of defence should be a military officer, the military budget remains practically unchecked by civilians, and more shockingly, military tribunals for civilians became constitutional. Enough guarantees not only to keep the military out of politics but also to win the military on the President’s side in situations of crisis? Not really.
The relations between the presidency and the military came into question only few weeks after the constitution was ratified. While fierce clashes took place in Cairo and many other governorates to commemorate the revolution second anniversary, Suez Canal cities (Suez, Portsaid and Ismailia) witnessed bloody clashes, especially after a football violence verdict, leading to the death of more than 50 and the injury of 1000.
Given the police inability to handle the situation, along with the strategic importance of the Suez Canal where clashes were only meters away, the President decided to deploy the army in Suez Canal cities and called for an urgent meeting with the National Defence Council (NDC), composed of key military and police leaders including ministers of defence and interior and headed by the President.
The NDC released a statement according to which it has granted itself the right to declare a state of emergency and called for national dialogue. More importantly, however, was that the statement reflected nothing but the weakness of the presidency vis-à-vis the military. The statement included a clause in which the NDC, headed by the President, stresses that ‘the army belongs to the people’ and that it will always stay neutral. One cannot help but remember a similar statement made by SCAF after its first meeting without Mubarak, only few days after the eruption of the revolution in 2011.
While it is true that it was Mubarak’s absence from the SCAF that gave the statement its weight, Morsi’s presence in the NDC meeting, however, is what precisely undermined the presidency and revealed its inability to block such unnecessary statement from being published.
As the situation deteriorated, Morsi declared state of emergency and curfew in the Suez Canal three cities for 30 days. Morsi’s declaration came in a televised speech where he appeared nervous and threatened of fiercer measures in case of non-compliance. No better opportunity for the military to watch Morsi’s decay than this one.
The Muslim Brothers do not seem to learn from their predecessors. In 1977, the military imposed a curfew during the ‘food riots’ only after Sadat agreed to withdraw all economic decisions that increased prices. Without concessions from Morsi’s side, it was impossible for the military to intervene. As a matter of fact, Egyptians mocked Morsi’s curfew and organised demonstrations that start with the curfew hours. Youth in Suez and Ismailia organised football tournaments in celebration of the curfew. Street weddings and fireworks were also reported in Port Said to defy Morsi’s decision.
It is not surprising that the military enjoyed public defiance of the curfew. The commanders of the second and third field armies stationed in Suez and Ismailia declared that they would not shoot protestors and will only ‘try’ and implement the curfew through ‘dialogue’. The truth is, they have never tried.
Pictures of protestors marching the streets during the curfew surrounded by smiling army soldiers were spreading in social media. More interestingly, the circulation of a video showing army officers playing football with protestors during the curfew was just another blow to Morsi’s authority. To add to the embarrassment of Morsi and the Muslim Brothers, the army spokesperson posted numerous pictures of the commanders of the second and third field armies while visiting injured protesters, who were allegedly shot by the President’s police. The generals showed their support to injured courageous protestors and have even given them gifts on behalf of General Al-Sisi, who has also given his orders to treat some of them in military hospitals. No wonder that the President, Muslim Brothers officials or ministers were unable to compete with the military in this occasion.
While General Al-Sisi’s winning card ‘live and let die’ seems successful in keeping the military theoretically out of the political struggle while exposing the decline of the Muslim Brothers, the General did warn from a ‘SkyFall’. In a recent statement by the defence minister, considered the strongest since his appointment, he warned that the political struggle between the various political forces might lead to the ‘collapse of the Egyptian state’.
It seems that General Al-Sisi is actually warning the Muslim Brothers from using the damaging card of ‘die and let die’. As the relations between the Muslim Brothers and the military is turning into a zero-sum game, the Muslim Brothers can never play with Al-Sisi’s ‘live and let die’ card, for that Egypt may survive the perishing of the Muslim Brothers but not of the military.
The Muslim Brothers might have thought of playing the ‘die and let die’ card only to gain some time to reorganise itself and reframe its relations with the military. Probably the Muslim Brothers’ winning bid would be to develop a ‘live and let live’ strategy, which would mean that they may have to get rid of Morsi and/or offer a number of concessions to the various political forces as well as to the military.
While Egypt has a chance of surviving the ‘Skyfall scenario’ if the ‘live and let live’ card is played, it seems, however, that the only cards on the table at the moment are those of ‘live and let die’ and ‘die and let die’.
The soundtracks of James Bond movies ‘Live and Let Die’ and ‘Skyfall’ have been particularly useful in understanding the relations between Egyptian Minister of Defence General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi and the Muslim Brotherhood's President Mohamed Morsi, which is deeply significant to the country’s deepening political and economic crises.
The ongoing clashes that have taken place in Egypt since the commemoration of the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution on 25 January 2013 have unveiled the basis of the military’s strategy towards the Muslim Brotherhood. For political analysts, the position of the military establishment in Egypt and its relation to President Morsi had been a perplexing matter, especially after his removal of long serving minister of defence Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi in August 2012.
Some have argued that, for the first time in Egypt’s history, the military establishment had subordinated itself to a civilian president that was democratically elected, regardless of the latter's affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood. As time passes, and as the political crisis intensifies, however, the disparity between the military and the presidency becomes evident and harder to ignore.
While the presidency struggles to survive, the military watches the Muslim Brotherhood's decline with amusement. General El-Sisi, a religiously pious military leader deeply respected within the officer corps, has tailored the military’s strategy towards President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Such a strategy is perfectly manifested in Sir Paul McCartney’s James Bond song ‘Live and Let Die’.
Al-Sisi’s strategy is informed by the SCAF’s daunting experience in power for a year and half, when it was harshly criticised for its inability to handle the transitional period. Egypt’s new defence minister made the restoration of the military’s ‘prestige’ and appealing image his prime goal. He appointed an army spokesperson who became responsible for answering media inquiries and reflecting the army’s professionalism and discipline. Through his Facebook page that has almost 100,000 subscribers, the army spokesperson publishes news, pictures and videos of the army’s achievements in enhancing Egypt’s security and stability, with almost no mention of President Morsi, reflecting the military’s indifference towards the political leadership.
The Muslim Brotherhood, however, has contributed to the development of the military’s ‘live and let die’ strategy that, although appealing at the beginning, turned into the President's worst nightmare. The Muslim Brotherhood's constant fear and distrust of the military has made them suspicious of military leaders’ actions.
This was evident when clashes erupted in front of the presidential palace last December, in the aftermath of mass protests against Morsi’s constitutional decree that granted him unlimited powers. General El-Sisi called all political forces for a dialogue to solve the political deadlock that the country was suffering from. The presidency was outraged with the military’s intervention in the political process and pressed the ministry of defence to withdraw its initiative.
On the day of the proposed gathering, the ministry of defence had to call off the meeting. While the presidency celebrated its power over the military establishment, pushing it to withdraw its invitation, the army chief remained silent, waiting to reap the rewards of the presidency’s floundering. The Muslim Brotherhood sought to appease the military by granting it more privileges in the new constitution in order to guarantee its neutrality.
According to the new constitution, the minister of defence should be a military officer, the military budget remains practically unchecked by civilians, and more shockingly, military tribunals for civilians became constitutional. Enough guarantees to not only keep the military out of politics but also win the military over to the President’s side in situations of crisis? Not really.
The relations between the presidency and the military came into question only a few weeks after the constitution was ratified. While fierce clashes took place in Cairo and many other governorates to commemorate the revolution's second anniversary, Suez Canal cities (Suez, Port Said and Ismailia) witnessed bloody clashes, especially after a football violence verdict, leading to the death of more than 50 and the injury of 1000.
Given the police's inability to handle the situation, along with the strategic importance of the Suez Canal, where clashes were only metres away, the President decided to deploy the army in Suez Canal cities and called for an urgent meeting of the National Defence Council (NDC), composed of key military and police leaders including ministers of defence and interior and headed by the President.
The NDC released a statement according to which it has granted itself the right to declare a state of emergency and called for national dialogue. More importantly, however, was that the statement reflected nothing but the weakness of the presidency vis-à-vis the military. The statement included a clause in which the NDC, headed by the President, stresses that ‘the army belongs to the people’ and that it will always stay neutral. One cannot help but remember a similar statement made by the SCAF after its first meeting without Mubarak, only a few days after the eruption of the revolution in 2011.
While it is true that it was Mubarak’s absence from the SCAF that gave the statement its weight, Morsi’s presence in the NDC meeting, however, is what precisely undermined the presidency and revealed its inability to block such an unnecessary statement from being published.
As the situation deteriorated, Morsi declared a state of emergency and curfew in the three Suez Canal cities for 30 days. Morsi’s declaration came in a televised speech where he appeared nervous and threatened fiercer measures in case of non-compliance. No better opportunity for the military to watch Morsi’s decay than this one.
The Muslim Brotherhood does not seem to learn from its predecessors. In 1977, the military imposed a curfew during the ‘food riots’ only after Anwar Sadat agreed to withdraw all economic decisions that increased prices. Without concessions from Morsi’s side, it was impossible for the military to intervene. As a matter of fact, Egyptians mocked Morsi’s curfew and organised demonstrations that started with the curfew hours. Youth in Suez and Ismailia organised football tournaments in celebration of the curfew. Street weddings and fireworks were also reported in Port Said to defy Morsi’s decision.
It is not surprising that the military enjoyed public defiance of the curfew. The commanders of the second and third field armies stationed in Suez and Ismailia declared that they would not shoot protestors and would only ‘try’ and implement the curfew through ‘dialogue’. The truth is, they never tried.
Pictures of protestors marching the streets during the curfew surrounded by smiling army soldiers spread in social media. More interestingly, the circulation of a video showing army officers playing football with protestors during the curfew was just another blow to Morsi’s authority.
To add to the embarrassment of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, the army spokesperson posted numerous pictures of the commanders of the second and third field armies while visiting injured protesters, who were allegedly shot by the President’s police. The generals showed their support to injured courageous protestors and have even given them gifts on behalf of General El-Sisi, who has also given his orders to treat some of them in military hospitals. No wonder that the President, Muslim Brotherhood officials or ministers were unable to compete with the military on this occasion.
While General El-Sisi’s winning card ‘live and let die’ seems successful in keeping the military theoretically out of the political struggle while exposing the decline of the Muslim Brotherhood, the General did warn from a ‘SkyFall’. In a recent statement by the defence minister, considered the strongest since his appointment, he warned that the political struggle between the various political forces might lead to the ‘collapse of the Egyptian state’.
It seems that General El-Sisi is actually warning the Muslim Brotherhood from using the damaging card of ‘die and let die’. As the relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military is turning into a zero-sum game, the Muslim Brotherhood can never play with El-Sisi’s ‘live and let die’ card, for Egypt may survive the perishing of the Muslim Brotherhood but not of the military.
The Muslim Brotherhood might have thought of playing the ‘die and let die’ card only to gain some time to reorganise itself and reframe its relations with the military. Probably the Muslim Brotherhood's winning bid would be to develop a ‘live and let live’ strategy, which would mean that they may have to get rid of Morsi and/or offer a number of concessions to the various political forces as well as to the military.
While Egypt has a chance of surviving the ‘Skyfall scenario’ if the ‘live and let live’ card is played, it seems, however, that the only cards on the table at the moment are those of ‘live and let die’ and ‘die and let die’.
*Mona El-Kouedi has recently submitted her PhD thesis at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She is currently a Research Fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome. The opinions expressed in this article are her own, and must not be attributed to the NATO Defence College or to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
