“Nobody knows anything about us, neither the liberals nor the Islamists. They are just busy with the constitution and other things,” a worker at an informally built industrial area near Abu Zabaal, Qalyubia, said on a TV show.

Bashing the Egyptian state for its utter failure in Sinai is no longer news. But some microcosmic incidents still illustrate the state’s impotence in dealing with the tumultuous border area.

Like many of my compatriots, I aspired that after the elimination of Mubarak and his constitution there would be an honest and sophisticated debate about the constitution that would outline the principles and fundamentals that must be the foundation for the existence and continuation of the Egyptian people.

Salafis might accept procedural democracy — that is to say the vote and the ballot box — as a means that allows them to attain power. But do they accept the core values of democracy? Do they respect personal freedom, diversity, coexistence and mutual understanding? In this debate with a Salafi friend, Amr Ezzat pinpoints 12 contentious issues that attempt to shed light on conservative Islamist thinking.

It is the first anniversary of the death of Essam Ali Atta - an occasion to revisit the issue of torture and ask what President Morsi has done so far to confront this serious issue.

The constitution is the ultimate legal document that will be the foundation, along with the laws based on it, for Egypt to either move forward to install proper democratic rule or regress to tyranny wrapped in the cloak of superficial Islamism.

In the wake of the Arab Spring, Tunisia and Egypt are in the very early stages of constructing theocratic democracies

The Egyptian revolution blew the top off a deeply divided society. It did much more, as its creators recreated themselves, the few thousands became hundreds of thousands, and a nation in which political space had all but withered away, found itself politicized in ways and to such a degree, unprecedented for generations, possibly since the birth of politics on the banks of the Nile in the mid-to-late 19th century.

The Brotherhood’s unconditional loyalty to the murshid (the supreme guide) is, for the first time, no longer guaranteed

It is somewhat unusual for a writer who normally ponders major strategic issues of war and peace or development and growth

I was invited on a satellite channel to discuss the worries of Egyptian citizens, which reminded me that in 2011 Gallup carried out 148 surveys around the world based on this question: Did you experience any of these feelings yesterday: physical pain, worry, sadness, pressure, anger?

In the first part of this article, I have argued that Islamists, especially the Brotherhood, have recently demonstrated an immense fear from the so called "civil" camp. This is evident in their attacks on the "civil" groups in prayer sermons and various other media outlets. The pressing question is why would mighty Islamists be so frightened from their supposedly “insignificant” competitor? Surely it can’t be because of the size or strength of the latter — or is it? I for one believe that what is now known as the “civil” camp is larger than Islamists want to believe, but is nevertheless smaller than to properly account for the Islamist anxiety above. The roots of the Brotherhood’s panic must lie elsewhere. So let me propose instead that the Brotherhood and its allies are actually afraid of “the people,” even if they formulate their fears as hostility towards the “civil” camp.

To those unfamiliar with the “civil”/religious debate in Egypt, the term “civil” was recently dubbed to mark an assembly of disparate, sometimes conflicting, ideologies and positions that stand for the creation of what has come to be known as a “civil state.” This “civil state” is in turn commonly imagined as something that stands against a theocratic (Islamic) state, but not necessarily against political Islam per se — for there are several Islamic versions of the “civil.” The term “civil” forced itself on public debate for the first time perhaps during the 2005 parliamentary elections, when the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the only serious contender to the old ruling party. Since then, its evolution led it to acquire multiple meanings, like all other political signifiers. One can even make the ready argument that it is currently but an empty signifier, but such is true of all political signifiers (for example, the much cherished linguistic mess that we call “democracy”).

Egyptians, along with others in the region, drew parallels between the Kuwaiti situation and the revolutions of the Arab Spring

A Muslim Brotherhood leader whose views did not change after the group reached power said he is more worried about the Brotherhood

I do, however, make a link specifically between extremism and how medicine and engineering are taught

Roughly 2,400 electors on 29 October will cast ballots to narrow the field for the papal seat of the Coptic Orthodox Church from the current five candidates down to three

Roughly 2,400 electors on 29 October will cast ballots to narrow the field for the papal seat of the Coptic Orthodox Church from the current five candidates down to three.

To my mind, the revolution was only an escalation of the polarization between those who want change and others adamant on maintaining the status quo. In February 2011, those who chose the revolution insisted on bringing down the head of the regime to open the gates of change. Their insistence on change caused them to be accused of wanting to drive a rift in society, but those accusations did not stop them from revolting and engaging in street fights on 2 and 3 February, in what came to be called the Battle of the Camel. These battles were a perfect manifestation of that societal polarization.

The Muslim Brotherhood did not do anything odd when their Supreme Guidance Bureau decided to mobilize members and send them to the streets to stage a protest on October 12 to call for purging the judiciary of corruption and sacking the public prosecutor. It is quite common for those in power to decide to resort to street protests to boast their popularity, alongside their use of official channels to disseminate their views.

The volume of aid Egypt has received is more than the majority – if not all – of its Third World peers have ever seen. In the 1950s and 1960s Egypt had special ties to the Soviet Union, which no other non-Marxist country enjoyed. International relations are not necessarily built on ideological or religious harmony, but most essentially economic and strategic interests. Egypt is a key state, which is why Soviet military and economic assistance flowed generously in its direction.