The scene is not easily forgotten: Tahrir erupts in jubilation as Egypt’s first democratically-elected civilian president opens his jacket to demonstrate to the thousands assembled, and the millions watching on television, that he is not wearing a bulletproof vest. Mohamed Morsy’s intended message was clear: this president is no Pharaoh. Like his fellows in the square — indeed, like the humble tuk tuk driver — he is simply an Egyptian. Whatever distinction he enjoys is derived entirely from the choice of Egyptians. And, though he was chosen by only a narrow majority of the electorate, he commits himself to serve as president for all Egyptians.

Politics has taken its toll on the Salafi Nour Party and plunged that seemingly coherent political body into an open conflict, the end of which is unpredictable.

While it is not a new thing to suffer as a Copt, the raised expectations of better treatment after the revolution turned to be a big frustration. It is not simply about complaining; the goal of the article is to highlight the Copts’ plight and how to overcome those sufferings.

When the Muslim Brotherhood was counted among the opposition, before the 25 January revolution, the group took part in several discussions with civil political forces and human rights organizations, both domestic and international, to present political Islam’s view of democracy, the rotation of power and human rights. Yet the wheels of the debate continued to spin, as a precaution against that hypothetical moment in which the Islamic current would reach the seat of power and the apprehensions of civil political forces would be borne out: the quashing, by democratic means, of the dream of a democratic transition and respect for human rights.

If you’ve ever been to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York and looked at the labels describing its many Egyptian artifacts, you would think they were all discovered in Europe. The Rogers Fund, gifts of Edward S. Harkness, gifts of the Egyptian Exploration Fund (a group of wealthy English travelers and adventurers) and the museum itself, among others, are thanked for bestowing such an expansive collection of antiquities to visitors of the Dawn of Egyptian Art wing. Apparently, the dawn of Egypt came when Europeans arrived to witness it.

The real trigger of popular protest movements and their escalation is widespread injustice and the failure of mechanisms in place to alleviate injustice. This causes people to resort to a legitimate form of expression about their grievances about injustice and its perpetrators, as well as the slow pace of exercising justice, which is the goal of proper democratic rule.

What has become increasingly clear is that Islamists themselves are engaged in a fierce political battle to determine their own identity

The Egyptian modern state has since its conception been suspicious of the public organizing themselves

A state of general — yet perhaps less articulated — dissatisfaction and frustration with Egyptian foreign policy over the last two decades has certainly been one of the causes for the accumulated popular fury that sparked the 25 January revolution. Foreign policy took a backseat to demands reflecting more pressing socio-economic and internal political grievances during the uprising and in the dominant discourse which followed the epic downfall of former President Hosni Mubarak. So much so in fact, that — regrettably — much attention was drawn away from foreign policy issues, especially US and Israeli intervention and desperate attempts to influence political outcomes during the height of the crisis in January and February 2011.

As the dust settles following the “Arab Spring,” which unseated some of the Middle East’s longest surviving dictators, elected governments have formally entered a tough race against time to meet the wide range of expectations of their people. This places a large burden on the extremely exhausted finances of these countries.

Hassan El-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, built a strong organisation that spread throughout the Islamic world, but he failed to turn Egypt into a state that reflected his vision.

LONDON — The Muslim world cannot have it both ways. It cannot place Islam at the center of political life — and in extreme cases political violence — while at the same time declaring that the religion is off-limits to contestation and ridicule.

The lesson is: freedom of speech does not exist in Islam.

"The president has to balance between his domestic alliances with ultraconservative Islamists and Egypt's relations with the US"

'Take care America, we have 1.5 billion ‘Bin Ladens.’

The formation of the Constituent Assembly has been described using largely the same term; haphazard

If thuggery were a profession, it would make little sense for thugs to do business in hospitals over other places

The sales tax in the 1990s, income tax reform in 2005, and proposed property tax in 2010: while Mubarak’s regime was politically stagnant

I'm not a conspiracy theorist, but I strongly sense conspiracy in the whole sordid "film maligning the Prophet" fracas

On one of the last pieces he published at Salon before moving to The Guardian, the American columnist Glenn Greenwald mounted a devastating critique of what he labeled, in the article’s title, “The Sham ‘Terrorism Expert’ Industry.” In his inimitable style, Greenwald proceeded to discuss the work of several so-called terrorism experts — among them, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross,

In Egypt, no one dismissed Morsi because of race or colour, but because the Brotherhood had historically always been politically scorned