The Libya issue is very complicated, beyond local players. This article may not be enough to discuss all aspects of the problem, but what is certain is that we should not quarrel over the parameters of Egypt’s national security. This is a red line irrespective of the type of regime in power. It is also unacceptable to dispute supporting our soldiers when they are on the battlefield.

There is no difference if the choices are coming from those in power or from some theoreticians, or under the weight and challenges of political and security turbulence or terrorism and the advisory opinions emanating from this situation.

In the 26th year of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Somalia recently became the 195th state party to ratify the convention. As South Sudan is expected to ratify the Convention later his year, the US would be the only country in the world that hasn’t yet ratified the CRC.

It’s been decades since optimism reigned in Egypt as it did yesterday after the announcement of giant development and construction plans heralding a “new Egypt”. Amid the positivity, there was no mention of the words “Muslim Brotherhood” and there was no talk of the absurd audio leaks, an attempt by rivals to pit the people against the government. Indeed, the Egypt Economic Development Conference (EEDC) has been a smart move; its sole focus on advancing Egypt—at a time when Brotherhood-affiliated media outlets are full of explosive stories aimed at damaging its leadership.

Exactly one year ago, in an article titled: “So how is the Economy”, we spoke about the reality, mistakes and solutions for the Egyptian economy. Now, as the as final preparations are underway for Egypt’s Economic Development Conference which is set to take place in Sharm El-Sheikh, the same question comes back to mind: Are we on the right track?

Expectations are running high, as Egyptians anticipate tangible improvements as soon as the economic conference is over.

Did the revolution lose its direction on the course of the years, or did it fail from the very beginning? Looking at the current political scene, Egypt is ‘back to square one’. More than four years after the 25 January Revoltuion, Egyptians stand at different sides. But the only consensus that revolutionary youth, who chanted in Tahrir Square, have, is that Egypt today is not the one they were dreaming of back then.

There is no difference if the choices are coming from those in power or from some theoreticians, or under the weight and challenges of political and security turbulence or terrorism and the advisory opinions emanating from this situation.

The Court declared Article 3 of the law on electoral districting unconstitutional, which means it must be amended before the coming parliamentary elections are rescheduled, days before they were due to start.

Since the Egyptian army took over political power in Egypt in mid-2013, tensions with the United States have escalated, twisted and turned unexpectedly.

Palestinians have begun talks on the possible impact of a Cairo court ruling that designated Hamas, which governs the Gaza Strip, a terrorist group.

Life has certainly always been full of many colours. Despite the recent attempt being made to use new, non-traditional colours that have never been used before, only two colours – black and white – should define the relationship between a state and its citizens (in other words, whether the rule of law is applied and enforced). Egypt, however, only functions using the colour grey – not because it is a favourite colour, but for a very specific purpose.

Last month, Egypt celebrated the fourth anniversary of the January 25 Revolution. Four years have passed since that Tuesday afternoon when the foundations of the Mubarak regime were shaken by popular protest and democracy-empowered collective action. Honestly, it was very difficult at the time to envision that the events that took place on that day would lead to the reality Egypt lives at the present time.

For decades, Egyptian regimes have adopted the principle of not getting involved in direct wars against terrorism outside Egyptian borders, limiting confrontations to radical militant groups in its territories. Even with the rise of the regional terrorist threat, the ascent and expansion of the Islamic State (IS) group, and the formation of an international coalition to fight the group, the Egyptian state maintains its position of refusing to get involved in military action, limiting its contribution to providing intelligence support. This is the same role that Egypt has been playing for years in the war on terror.

For decades, Egyptian regimes have adopted the principle of not getting involved in direct wars against terrorism outside Egyptian borders, limiting confrontations to radical militant groups in its territories. Even with the rise of the regional terrorist threat, the ascent and expansion of the Islamic State (IS) group, and the formation of an international coalition to fight the group, the Egyptian state maintains its position of refusing to get involved in military action, limiting its contribution to providing intelligence support. This is the same role that Egypt has been playing for years in the war on terror.

Libya is witnessing armed chaos and division of regions as well as cities, while battles and conflicts are occurring between extremist militias and the Libyan army near Libyan cities. A lot of militias spread in Libya; all of them were formed after the fall of Gaddafi’s regime. The major armament assets of these brigades came from the stockpiles of the regime that kept amassing weapons over decades. This is why a lot of these militias appeared as small armies driving armoured

Libya is witnessing armed chaos and division of regions as well as cities, while battles and conflicts are occurring between extremist militias and the Libyan army near Libyan cities. A lot of militias spread in Libya; all of them were formed after the fall of Gaddafi’s regime. The major armament assets of these brigades came from the stockpiles of the regime that kept amassing weapons over decades. This is why a lot of these militias appeared as small armies driving armoured vehicles in the streets and within cities, and they frequently use RPGs in the smallest confrontations.

One of the most astounding phenomena following the brutal slaying of 21 Copts, who had been kidnapped since December 2014, is the hyper-nationalistic reactions within Egyptian society. These reactions of immediate unquestioning support to military response in Libya extend to numerous revolutionary hardliners who are greatly opposed to Al-Sisi’s rule, yet found in this atrociousness a chance to unite against a common enemy, temporarily putting aside fundamental differences with the regime. Considering the outrage, it is difficult to believe that three years ago, the Egyptian military ran over more Copts in Egypt than “Islamic State” killed in Libya, and no one was brought to account.

In his book “Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era”, Joseph Nye of Harvard University divided American presidents into two groups. One is made up of “transformational” leaders – those with the grandiose goal of using American influence to spread democracy and liberty around the world. The second group contains “transactional” leaders – pragmatists who have modest goals. Although I don’t completely agree with Nye’s conclusions, I agree with his premise of classifying leaders.

On the second day of what is actually being billed as the White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism, President Obama tried again today to explain his strategy for defeating ISIS. But as with his speech on Wednesday, the result was a confusing rhetorical mess that failed to prioritize the need to defeat the terrorists. The president is clearly worried about reinforcing what he considers to be ISIS’s narrative of this war, but in doing so he seems to have actually conceded victory to them. By doggedly sticking to his position that there is no such thing as Islamist terror and by focusing on the economic and political grievances of such groups, the president undermined any notion that the U.S. was committed to the fight. Indeed, rather than bolster the West’s resistance to ISIS, the massive effort expended on this public-relations extravaganza may have only solidified the belief among the terrorists that this president isn’t someone they should either fear or take seriously.

A stampede at a Cairo stadium earlier this month, much like a politically-loaded football brawl in the Suez Canal city of Port Said three years ago, is shining a spotlight on Egypt’s unreformed, unabashedly violent, and politically powerful police and security forces amid confusion over what precisely happened and how many fans died.