Religious sectarianism has a particularly bitter taste, and Egypt is presently witnessing one of its darkest chapters amid a spread of religious bigotry. But this is not new; a chronicle of brutality against religious minorities stains Egyptian history. What is new, however, is the hope for a better future brought about by the January 25 revolution.

In an interesting story called “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” Danish author Hans Christian Andersen tells the story of an emperor who wanted to know which of his officers were not worthy of their positions.

Three weeks ago, I briefly reviewed here “Nostalgia for the Light,” Patricio Guzmán’s wonderful documentary about mass murders and forced disappearances in Chile under Pinochet. I was deeply touched by Guzmán’s sensitivity in showcasing the suffering of victims’ families and their relentless efforts to find out what had happened to their loved ones.

Copts are being persecuted in Egypt. So, what’s new about that? This has been the norm in our “beloved homeland” since at least the 1970s.

Deplorable sectarian clashes that took place on 7 April at St. Mark's Cathedral in Cairo following the violence, two days earlier, between Muslims and Christians in the underprivileged area of Al-Khosous in Qalioubiya (north of Cairo), shows once again the rise of sectarianism in Egypt since the popular uprising of January 25, which toppled the regime of Hosni Mubarak.

During the particularly hair-raising moments of the revolution, when some of the popular committees manning checkpoints on the streets were taking their jobs extremely seriously and matters were more than a touch vigilante, I crossed paths with one of these committees in downtown Cairo after curfew.

Since the polarization of pro-revolution and counter-revolution camps in the aftermath of the March 2011 referendum, post-revolutionary Egypt has seen several consecutive binaries.

Last week, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz published an article about a confidential document written in 1973 recently released by Israel's Ministry of Defense. The document contains intelligence Israel received before the October War started. Along with information sent by agent Ashraf Marwan that Sadat had taken the decision to open fire in coordination with Syria, the article focused on new intelligence in the document originating from the office of Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan.

22 June 1961: The National Assembly is almost vacant. Some 89 members send their regrets; 42 are excused; and 48 are absent without excuse or permission. The atmosphere is tense inside the room and all eyes are turned to the podium where a number of military revolution commanders are sitting, alongside Parliament Speaker Anwar Al-Sadat is warning attending MPs about the consequences of resisting the proposed legislation being discussed in this rushed debate.

The revolutionaries who reluctantly voted for President Mohamed Morsy in the runoffs in the presidential election — the “Lemon Squeezers,” as many called them — are once again coming under fire. The Lemon Squeezers are being held responsible for Morsy’s confused decisions. The main goal of this attack is to have those reluctant voters say they made a mistake by not voting for Ahmed Shafiq, Morsy’s contender in the runoff. The point is to reinstate Shafiq as a viable option in preparation for his return as the savior from Muslim Brotherhood misery.

I had gone to Tahrir nearly two hours earlier to check on my sister. She had beaten me there and had succeeded in foiling an attempt by security forces to arrest her 15-year-old son. After I had made sure that she’d go home, and after I’d lied to her telling her that I, too, would go home, I joined a crowd of about three or four thousand people at the corner of Mohamed Mahmoud Street.

There is a widespread myth that Egyptian Muslims and Christians are alike and that “Egyptian society is formed from a single fibre.” The idea betrays a failure to understand how differently Egyptian Christians and Muslims see themselves, and their society.

It is a motley crew that finds shelter in Tahrir Square these days. On the afternoon of 7 April, a man at a tea stand wanted to see off a youth and so threw a glass mug at him. It missed the youth and hit someone next to him, shattering into tiny fragments on his head. The man made a brief apology as he turned around to sit back down and his victim raised his hand in the air and said, "No problem," as he staggered away.

Former US President Bill Clinton signed a presidential decree on 21 June 1995 to allow the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to send suspected terrorists to foreign countries, including Egypt, to exercise the required interrogations and investigations.

Higher Education Reform in Post-Revolution Egypt by Anthony J. Perzigian, PhD, Board of Trustees Chair Adviser, Future University in Egypt, and Provost and Professor Emeritus, University of Cincinnati (USA)

Former US President Bill Clinton signed a presidential decree on 21 June 1995 to allow the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to send suspected terrorists to foreign countries, including Egypt, to exercise the required interrogations and investigations.

Over the past three weeks, Egypt has witnessed several electoral experiments that deserve deep reflection and analysis.

Political violence among citizens, which has been escalating for months, is less dangerous than violence which occurs between citizens and state institutions.

In the past two months, circumstances allowed me to visit three royal palaces, two of which were abroad, and the third in Egypt. I found myself assessing comparing and lamenting the miserable condition of Egypt's palaces and museums.

Gaining freedom of speech and other forms of unfettered public visibility after long decades of repression and silencing – thanks to the January 25 Revolution – the Muslim Brothers now raise their collective voice in defence of patriarchal oppression writ wide and deep.

Since February 2011, Egyptian authorities have designed their fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies for the sole purpose of preventing the gradual rise of prices for the broad base of Egyptians, in particular, the urban poor and the lower-middle classes.