Egypt has a long history of distrust of opposition groups by the authorities, which at times included accusing it of disloyalty and working on behalf of foreign powers

On Monday morning, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi woke up and didn’t recognize himself in the mirror.

President Mohamed Morsi had US support before dismissing Field Marshal Tantawi, who had worked with the US for decades

President Mohamed Morsy’s recent decision to force Egypt’s most prominent military leaders into retirement has been lauded as a major step toward the demilitarization of the Egyptian state. For some optimists, his decision represents the triumph of the revolution over its adversaries inside the military establishment. There is indeed little doubt that this event will prove monumental and may be the prelude to a new era in civil-military relations in Egypt.

Last week, sixteen Egyptian soldiers were killed at a Rafah border checkpoint in a cowardly attack by militants reportedly belonging to Geishul-e-Islam and Al-Jihad (holy war) donning the mantle of al-Qaeda. The treacherous attack occurred after Egypt elected a new president loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian army received firm instructions from President Morsi and is now launching an all-out counterattack on these terrorists, who are reportedly hiding in the mountainous Sinai.

The comments made by revolutionary activists on the attack in which 16 Egyptian officers and soldiers were killed at the Karam Abu Salem checkpoint at the Egypt-Israel border are noteworthy. While some of them were confident that Israel was responsible for the attack, others were quite sure that Hamas perpetrated it.

The violence at the Nile City Towers 10 days ago left one dead and more than 22 injured, in addition to damaged property. It also created panic in the area and sparked a firestorm of rumors and speculations about the causes and possible ramifications of the incident, such as fears of more violence and worries that it signaled the beginning of the dreaded revolution of the hungry.

In a span of 10 days, militants killed 16 Egyptian guards near the Israeli border, Amr al-Bunni died trying to collect his wages from Nile City Towers, and Moaz Mohamed lost his life to a burnt shirt in Dahshur. In Egypt today, tragedy and farce are two faces of one coin.

The revolution's overriding call: "the people demand the overthrow of the regime", could mean only one thing, the dismantling of this web of inequity; yet, for the military command, which presumably saved the revolution by not shooting at the protesters (ultimately a rather short term kindness), this was a recipe for disaster.

This is the revolution of rural dwellers. Urban dwellers are more calculating, it seems. But rural folks, inside and outside the city, are in revolt.

What happened in Dahshour last week confirms that there is a deep problem in Egyptian society. What I call "the sectarian syndrome" bluntly describes the crisis between Christians and Muslims. The current environment is unhealthy to build bridges between the two sides. The reactions by President Morsi and other organisations in Egypt, such as the Shura Council (upper house of parliament) and the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights are good and necessary, but they are not enough to end the repeated clashes between the two sides in different regions, such as Koshh, Al-Zawaya Al-Hamra, Atfiah and others. There are structural changes needed to tackle the roots of the problem.

I was never an athlete or sports expert, but sports intrigued me as a model of human competition and social concepts, just like music, theatre and literature, which hold international human qualities irrespective of gender, colour, religion, ethnicity, creed or anything else that distinguishes one human being from another.

I am about to put myself into the shoes of Mohamed Morsy, our new president, if just for the purpose of this article. As president, I have been in power for one month, and the nation is waiting for me to fulfil the promises I made for the first 100 days of my presidency.

On the eve of the infamous “Battle of the Camel” on 2 February last year, Hosni Mubarak gave an emotionally-charged speech, recounting his love for Egypt and pledging not to run for another presidential term.

In one week, there have been three calls of a new kind to mobilise the street. They are united by a common theme that is unrelated to the constitution or elections or transfer of power or any of these key political issues that have dominated the scene since the January revolution

In one week, there have been three calls of a new kind to mobilise the street. They are united by a common theme that is unrelated to the constitution or elections or transfer of power or any of these key political issues that have dominated the scene since the January revolution. “We want to live,” “We will not pay” and “A clean country” are three campaigns that focus on issues that are more tangible than the battles of previous months. They all focus on average citizens.

Egyptians who feel buffeted by one startling judicial ruling after another seem at first glance to have been given a respite last week. Cairo’s administrative courts seemed to back off, postpone, and duck the enormous issues before them — challenges to the current Constituent Assembly, the dispersal of Parliament, and the audacious June 2012 supplement to the country’s Constitutional Declaration were postponed or ruled beyond the reach of the courts. But there was far less modesty than meets the eye here. A little noticed but far reaching implication of last weeks’ rulings is that the SCAF’s June rewriting of the transition plan is here to stay.

Now is a good moment to revisit the idea of a “technocratic government,” the type of government which the just-appointed prime minister Hesham Qandil said he intends to form, and which has circulated incessantly among the political elite

The proposed amendments to Article 2 of the constitution – giving Al-Azhar the final say in defining Islamic Law (Sharia) – is of critical importance, not only because it limits Islamic knowledge to Al-Azhar, but also because it transfers the debate over the institution of Al-Azhar to the issue of identity.

The tragic shooting that took place in Aurora, Colorado may be one of the least politically significant mass murders of its kind in recent memory. James Holmes, a 24-year-old scientist, opened fire last Friday at a movie theatre killing 12 people and wounding 58 others. Mass shootings are not a novelty in America, but the Colorado tragedy should make us realize that two things are happening in the United States: the effort to restrict gun ownership rights is failing and society seems to be starting to come to grips with the sad reality that some tragedies can’t realistically be prevented.

“Mahmoud Bey”, parliamentarian and businessman, is talking to a group that includes senior officers in the security apparatus, at what appears to be a party just before the January 1977 bread riots. To the sound of background music more befitting a cabaret, Bey speaks about the need to privatize Alexandria's beaches and all public sector factories.