Before midnight on Friday, 17 May 2013, I decided to go to Tahrir Square to sign the "Rebel" campaign's petition, which asks for the withdrawal of confidence from President Mohamed Morsi El-Ayat. This was not an arbitrary decision, nor was it a product of the moment. It was the result of deep reflection as well as an appreciation for the importance of this campaign and what it calls for.

The news item read: “Hussein Salem decided to hand over 75 per cent of his wealth inside Egypt and 55 per cent of his fortune abroad in return for his name being removed from the wanted list and ending the legal pursuit of him and his family.”

I have mentioned before that the political life in Egypt can be divided in many ways. In an attempt to analyse the political map, I divided it into three major movements: the political Islamist group, the democratic group and the supporters of a hegemonic state. I went into detail regarding the third group, which is also known as feloul (remnants of the former regime) or the supporters of a nationalistic state, as they call themselves. I concluded that this group presents itself as a strictly conservative one given that will restore the old state. It also presents itself as a revolutionary group since it will renew the nationalistic state project, and will be an extension to the era of Muhammad Ali or Gamal Abdel Nasser. It promises to restore the advantages of the nationalistic state, but will get rid of its flaws. Generally that the most prominent figures of this group joined the Mou’tamar (Conference) Party led by Amr Moussa, and the Egyptian Patriotic Movement led by Ahmed Shafiq.

“After three months, I received the passport with a three-page letter in French rejecting my visa,” Ramy says bitterly. Like many Egyptians, 25-year-old Ramy planned to apply for a visa to the Schengen area (a scheme that permits internal travel between a large block of European Union countries) after he had been accepted into a master’s programme in Belgium for 2012. He gathered the acceptance letter he received from the university in Belgium, his visa application, and the required fees and applied for a student visa at the Belgian embassy in Cairo.

“The journey seeks to dig a canal in a desert covering thousands of miles to connect the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea, which would make Europe the neighbour of India and shortens the distance to it. This is the task Father Prosper Enfantin wants to accomplish with men of great destiny even though they are short on financial resources.”

As the satirical comedy show Al Bernameg returned to the CBC-TV network May 17 after a three-week hiatus, many Egyptians were shifting uncomfortably in their chairs. While host Bassem Youssef, known as the Jon Stewart of Egypt, has received much praise for being a witty, sarcastic provocateur of Egyptian political events, for some Egyptians he has crossed the line of propriety and respectful sarcasm.

Suddenly, and in the same week, three of the largest Islamist movements started talking about transitional justice, demanding its implementation at once. Spokesman for the Salfist front, Hisham Kamal, asserted, "Mubarak should have been tried for all his crimes from the start, not only for killing protestors." Political consultant to the El-Benaa wa El-Tanmia (Building and Development) Party, the political army of Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya, and member of the National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) Ossama Roshdy, said that the NCHR has set out to form a specialised committee for transitional justice. And member of the parliamentary bloc of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political army of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saad Emara said, "Torture crimes are not subject to a statute of limitations, and we cannot limit retribution to the previous regime alone and not its predecessors, even if they are no longer alive."

The rocket strikes that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai into the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years after Egypt’s revolution. Terrorist activity could easily cause a crisis on the border, with the potential to trigger an unwanted confrontation that would threaten the peace treaty that normalized bilateral relations in 1979. To avoid such an outcome, Israel and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.

There were variations in the application of this tradition. The difference between the Ottoman massacre of the 800 Christians at Otranto and, let us say, the Crusader massacre of thousands of Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem, is that women and children were enslaved at Otranto instead of being put to the sword, as was the case in Jerusalem. The men of Otranto were offered the customary opportunity - according to the Muslim rules of warfare - to save themselves by converting to Islam.

Since Egypt's January 25 Revolution, the condition of Islamists has dramatically changed. This requires rethinking the phenomenon, understanding its complexities and the challenges it poses, which promise to greatly influence decisions on the future of the country.

I was recently invited to the Bibliotheca Alexandrina to lecture about the experience of Islamist parties. During the question-and-answer section, a member of the audience asked me to stop criticising the Muslim Brotherhood and the president, because the whole Islamic project has become threatened.

Samer Soliman would have turned 45 on 2 May 2013 if he had not been snatched away by death on 23 December 2012 after a short battle with a vicious illness. The death of Samer was a personal loss to me, not only because he was a colleague at the American University in Cairo, but also because he was like a cousin to me, since his father, Mahrous Soliman, and my mother, Wedad Metry (may God bless them both) were tied together by a close, lifetime friendship that started when they worked side by side in the field of education.

The Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist El-Nour Party that dominated almost three-quarters of the seats in the People's Assembly (the since dissolved lower house of parliament) and more than 80 percent of the Shura Council (the upper house of parliament now invested with full legislative powers pending the election — expected in October — of a new lower house) have been locked in a power struggle that is increasingly defining a fractious political scene.

The settlement project in the West Bank is not just a collection of rickety caravans installed on Palestinian farmland that can be dismantled upon the signing of a peace agreement.

The mufti is a Muslim legal expert who is empowered to give rulings on religious matters. Every country that defines itself as Muslim has a grand mufti and an Iftaa institution that includes hundreds of muftis. These muftis have a specific education and must study an array of Islamic subjects, based on which sect of Islam each country follows. The role of this institution is to determine whether our laws and our practices as a people abide by our chosen sect and interpretation of Islamic laws. We Egyptians have one of the biggest Iftaa institutions for Sunni Muslims, and it has always been a progressive interpretation that takes into account the reality of our world.

Away from the current controversy between the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and other political forces, there is a dire need to seriously and realistically rethink the MB. Not only because it is the major power ruling Egypt right now, but also to understand the group’s dynamics as a formidable organisation and complicated social and political phenomenon.

The writings and statements of key “Islamist” figures about “the Islamic project” are endless. But the project remains ambiguous and mysterious in terms of its main ideas, which denotes disparities between their intentions.

The Egyptian economy is unlikely to collapse suddenly. However, in the absence of a serious macroeconomic stabilization program it will continue to deteriorate gradually, with low growth and increasing unemployment and inflation. Even corruption appears to be on the rise. The Egyptian people are also feeling the pinch in terms of higher prices and shortages of some imported necessities. If this continues, the transition to democracy could be jeopardized. On the other hand, politics in Egypt is so polarized that it is difficult to see how serious economic reforms could be implemented without first reaching compromises on some thorny political issues. Perhaps the recent agreement on a coalition government in Italy could serve as a model for Egyptian politicians.

It should be clear, as pointed out in several of my previous articles, that Egypt’s political circuit consists of three primary forces. The first of these is the country’s Islamist movement, made up primarily of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the second is those forces that seek to revive Egypt’s “old” hegemonic state, with the army, police, bureaucracy and state security forces at its core. Lastly, the third group consists of the country’s democracy movement,

This is what a group of friends and I debated in a heated discussion last week. One of them was a British friend who teaches history and politics at a major US university, and who reminded us that a key feature of European fascism of the 1930s was a strong alliance between industrialists and the state, whereby the latter was willing to pass draconian anti-labour laws for the benefit of the former.

Many demands for institutional reform lose their meaning if they are triggered by partisanship, are delayed despite an urgent public need for them or are revived only when a specific party needs them. Sometimes they are detached from their contexts that give them meaning and are limited to one choice, whereby rejecting them appears as rejection of reform in general and acceptance of the status quo. This is what happened in the ongoing debate about reforming Egypt's judiciary.