Sinai, a region so unfortunate in every imaginable aspect, on Wednesday witnessed simultaneous attacks on military sites and personnel. Islamic State-affiliated militant groups have claimed responsibility for the attacks, and the Egyptian army in response has launched a rigorous operation of retaliation to target members of terrorist groups in North Sinai.
It is very difficult to write about what happened and its implications without first expressing deep sorrow and grief for the innocent lives that were unjustly taken, and sincere disgust and contempt for such cruel disregard of human dignity. Perhaps the most accurate description of what is happening in Sinai right now is that it is both very sad and extremely alarming.
First, the situation in Sinai is alarming for more than one reason. Concerning the terrorist organisations operating in Sinai, whether you call them Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis, Sinai Province, or simply Daesh (the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State militant group), the overarching banner to which most domestic terrorist organisations pay allegiance, several developments must be taken into consideration while examining what happened in Sinai last week. There is an obvious change of pattern in the operational strategy of those last attacks. Unlike previous attacks on military sites in Sinai, this attack consisted of a series of simultaneous aggressions on numerous locations.
According to statements that Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis has published online, mines and other explosives were used on highways and connecting roads to block army reinforcements and back-up from reaching their desired destinations. At the same time, videos were released a few days before the attacks took place, in which the organisation announced its intention to carry out attacks on the second anniversary of the 30 June 2013 protests.
These developments have varied significance. First, there is indeed an expansion in the amount of resources available to the terrorist organisations in Sinai – not only financial resources, but also technical, human and logistic resources. Second, the operational and technical nature of the attacks point to a higher level of training and tactical ability in comparison with previous attacks in Sinai. Third, the simultaneous nature of the attacks and their geographical diffusion reaffirm the concept of decentralised operational strategy, bringing us back to questioning the extent of reliance on central leadership in this specific strain of terrorism.
Some analysts and media sources have interpreted these attacks to signal the intent the organisation had to declare sovereignty over a territorial parameter in Northern Sinai in order to declare an Islamic province. Whether this interpretation is accurate or not remains to be seen, but the geopolitical facts confirm the absolute difficulty of such an action while cornered by the Egyptian armed forces to the West and the Israeli Defense Force to the East.
Moreover, the IS-allied regional organisations have not conformed to the pattern of operations that prevails in the mother organisation’s strategy of existence in Iraq and Syria. The militant group's regional offshoots have maintained a level of autonomy in terms of operational strategy, depending on the geographical, military and political contexts under which they operate. The model applied in Iraq and Syria, within their specific contexts, will not necessarily be re-created in other regions.
The Egyptian army’s response was both swift and rapid. The army announced the murder of hundreds of terrorists a few hours after the attacks took place.
At the same time, the president has announced new legislative adjustments and alterations that will allow for the judicial process in national security and state security cases to be more conclusive with less procedural arrangements and conventional legal considerations.
Meanwhile, the cabinet has approved a new anti-terrorism legislation to give unprecedented powers to both the executive and the judiciary.
This is, of course, in addition to the media frenzy, which has developed from an anti-terrorism discourse into fully-fledged hate speech against all forms of opposition.
It is indeed understandable and expected for a state to strongly respond and even retaliate after such mean, cruel and violent attacks.
But the important question in this regard becomes: How can we ensure that the Egyptian state avoids past mistakes in dealing with the Sinai issue? How can we ensure that the state's response will take place according to a detailed counter-terrorism strategy, and not a rage-empowered process of crisis management?
After all, there is a big difference between a swift military response to an aggression on state foundations, and a strategic vision to counter a resilient and a recurrent threat.
There is nothing that could be done now to undo the sad events that took place in Sinai last Tuesday. However, what could and should be done is arriving at solutions and courses of action to ensure that what happened will not happen again.
The president stated that the fight against terrorism is going to be a long one, which is quite true, but in order for this fight to be an effective one, measures other than security ones must be taken.
Security is indeed a crucial dimension, but it is not the only one.
Any counter-terrorism strategy, and one designed for the Sinai specifically, will not be truly effective without taking into consideration economic, political, ethnic and cultural dimensions.
Sinai needs to be treated as a city, not as a terrorist hub. The people of Sinai, the Bedouins, must be treated as Egyptian citizens with equal rights and equal access to opportunities, not as potential suspects until proven otherwise.
The army’s extensive presence in Sinai must be accompanied by a rigorous development plan that builds infrastructure and creates economic opportunities.
At the same time, a legitimate political process must be underway, and a full inclusion of social and political forces in the fight against terrorism must take place.
Egypt’s need for actual constructive steps is a lot more pressing than its need for patriotic slogans.
Perhaps the most important lesson that we as Egyptians could learn from the recent attacks in Sinai is that it is about time to re-evaluate and re-consider our strategies for countering terrorism, and to develop new ones in a different and more constructive manner.
