The failed coup in Turkey has revealed an imbalance in the way of thinking between Islamist elites, the political Islamic current, and the military state in Egypt. If you take one look at the logic by which these “teams” analyse and react to recent events through traditional media platforms and social media networks, you will see that they are dealing with the changes in the way that fans of cockfighting would—there is no logic and no thinking. All you hear are the crazy cheers of fans who want to see more blood and death inside the ring.
The two teams have found similarities between what took place in Egypt three years ago and what took place in Turkey a few days ago. Supporters of the political Islamic current have recalled the scene of the 30 June Uprising amid their defence of the Turkish Murshid (supreme guide). They practised their inherited habit of linking cases with absolutely no connection to each other, and once the coup was announced as a failure, they went back to their old habits of living in delusion and telling lies that no one else believes. They go back to fooling themselves with legends about 30 June, the “Photoshop revolution”, their president who would eventually return to power, and the reeling coup.
On the other hand, the team of “state militarisation” and those who believe in pure military ruling have dealt with the situation with intellectual adolescence amid an imbalance of values. They were more supportive of the coup than the Turkish military itself. In fact, their stance was more extreme than those of historic opponents of the Justice and Development Party, the liberals and leftists, and the historic opponents of Erdogan, who were against the coup which would have destroyed the democratic rules that the Turkish people have lived by the past three decades.
Now that the Turkish coup is over, are the two teams capable of some clear thinking to try and see events from different perspectives? If the only common denominator between the two teams is the attempt to connect the 30 June Uprising in Egypt with 15 July in Turkey, does this mean there were actual similarities between the two events?
Initially, there are no similarities between the two events, neither on the track nor in the results. The 30 June Uprising was a movement by people of a various ideologies, widespread across Egypt and proceeded by political movements that escalated month after month until, finally, 30 June came.
The move called for the military institution’s intervention, according to its moral responsibility, of managing the transition stage after the 25 January Revolution. Thus, the military intervention on 30 June did not fall into dispute between the leaders and officials of the army.
On the other hand, 15 July was a military movement by a small group of centrist leaders in the Turkish army—it lacked the consensus of the military institution, political support, and public or moral justification.
In terms of motives and justification, there is a fundamental difference between the two events. The military institution intervention in Morsi’s removal was based on people’s demands—we can no longer doubt that they had numerical and political majority. We cannot call their demands into question either.
Erdogan and his party’s removal was not a public demand of any kind, even with the growing rage against Erdogan’s latest practices. Turkish people still believe that change can happen through the political track with no need for the military’s intervention.
While in Egypt, people were facing a religious, political faction that was restructuring policies and legislation in a way that served itself and its desire to remain in power. This faction was industrious in forming armed militia in anticipation of any moment of defiance with the Egyptian people.
The faction’s “Brotherhood-isation” of state institutions was based on sectarian partisan ideology, rather than on efficiency and professionalism. In one word, the Egyptian army’s intervention in Egypt was necessary to stop this fascist scheme.
Erdogan and his party in Turkey have achieved impressive economic success during the past decade and half and have improved the standard of living and public services for the Turkish people.
They adopted and announced transparent programmes which were viable for social and economic reforms. As a result, Erdogan gained popularity which helped him to adopt constitutional and legal amendments that deducted from the balance of “Atatürk” institutions that were considered his enemies.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt wanted to be paid in advance—they began by trying to tailor the constitution and the law to suit them before providing any indicator of their validity to rule.
July in Turkey differs completely from June in Egypt, the revolution is different from the coup, and the armies that move based on its people’s demands are different from those armies that are moving for their own interests.
Erdogan is not Morsi, Justice and Development is not the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Everything is different.
