“If we ever face such a terrible day as Kuwait did at the hands of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1990, we all know there are only two armies that can truly help us, including sending tens of thousands of soldiers if needed. They are the US and the Egyptian armies.”

According to my analysis, highlighted in previous articles, the state includes three major groups, specifically, the police state supporters, the benevolent dictator supporter and those who support administrative reform. What bring the three groups together are their great faith in oppression and their unlimited confidence in the power and ability of the state. In addition, they all doubt the efficiency of democracy and its practises.

This is what Al Sorat is all about. A bunch of happy animals teaching young people how to get along with the rest of the creatures in this world.” (Maryanne Stroud Gabbani, March 9, 2014)

It’s a running joke in the political circuits in developing countries: “Who needs a constitution over here?” Currently in Egypt, the joke has turned sour. Three years, six cabinets (not counting the reshuffles), two Constituent Assemblies and two constitutions after the 25 January Revolution, Egypt remains a country not bothered by its own governing laws.

“If we ever face such a terrible day as Kuwait did at the hands of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1990, we all know there are only two armies that can truly help us, including sending tens of thousands of soldiers if needed. They are the US and the Egyptian armies.”

I have been following your writings, and I must say that I’ve been a bit disappointed by the shift in your views lately. While you were a big supporter of 30 June and the end of the unfortunate episode of Egyptian history called “The Morsi Presidency”, it seems that you have started to take issue with the direction that the country is taking, especially when it comes to my role in it and its future. I think an explanation might be in order to clear the air between us.

There are three movements rooting for Field Marshal Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s nomination in the upcoming presidential elections. One of those movements is what we can call the popular current, which expresses the general mood of the people in the streets. The second movement is supporters of the former regime, including some of the state’s apparatus. The third movement is those who believe in the possibility of reform.

Egyptians know now what it was like to watch the Tahrir Square uprising in 2011 from outside of the country – because the same kind of media attention was recently projected on Ukraine. This country, which hasn’t been the subject of monthly breaking news for a while – let alone daily breaking news – has been constantly in the media for the last few weeks. The similarities to Egypt’s situation do not stop at international interest. No, they abound, tremendously, and are shown in so many different aspects of the revolutionary fervour that has swept Ukraine. Well, not really.

It is natural for a man to respond to a nagging female partner with violence. Women's demands for pay equal to men for equal skills are not justified, because women are likely to stop working to have children.

When Gouda Abdel Khalek was Minister of Supply in March of 2012 he made a very “novel” suggestion— not the good kind of novel. At the time, Egypt’s food subsidy programme supplies were woefully insufficient to feed the millions of Egyptians benefitting (in theory) from the assistance. With some governorates having no rice for distribution for many months in a row, Abdel Khalek suggested that Egyptians begin making mahshy, the rice-stuffed vegetable dish, with the orzo-like pasta, lissan asfor (sparrow’s tongue in Arabic), instead of rice. He proposed distributing pasta to make up for the food programme’s inability to secure and distribute rice.

The only logical explanation for the massacres against Copts in the Arab Ruin (Spring) states and the imposition of Jizya, a protection fee, on them is that there is a heinous conspiracy to stir a sectarian war, not only between Christians and Muslims, but also between all sects.

A few hours before starting to write this article, Prime Minister Hazem El-Beblawi’s cabinet resigned. This was expected even if the government was pushed into the resignation. However, El-Beblawi’s — even if it was delayed — was a much better option than being dismissed from his position.

In late 2013, Thomson Reuters conducted a poll ranking Egypt the worst country among 22 Arab League states for women’s rights. The poll measured women’s status in six different categories. First, “Women in politics” calculated women’s civil representation and presence in high public positions. “Women in society” measured tradition and cultural expectations and limitations of women within the society. “Women in the economy” measured their participation and equal pay in the workforce. “Women in the family” assessed women’s right to refuse or accept marriage, at what age, and their rights when separated. “Reproductive rights” evaluated access to healthcare and rights in childbearing. Finally, “Violence against women” assesses the levels of sexual assault and physical violence women suffer from and whether the offender is punished.

I believe Hesham Geneina, director of the Central Auditing Agency (CAA), is fighting on several fronts and dimensions. Under ousted president Hosni Mubarak, he was a key figure in the independent judiciary movement, and under deposed president Mohamed Morsi he was appointed CAA director by presidential decree. Because of the first, he is subject to fierce attacks by anti-revolution forces who want to sabotage and punish anyone who paved the way for the January 25 Revolution, including the independent judiciary movement and its leaders.

Egyptians recently concluded their second attempt at passing a constitution that conveys the aspirations of the 25 January 2011 uprising. However, the 2014 constitution is not much different than the now maligned “Morsi constitution” of 2012 — whether in content or process.

Why would the regime arrest and torture someone if they didn’t do anything wrong or if they can prove their innocence? Such a question seems to be a common logical retort by many Egyptians in response to accusations that the regime, personified in its security and judiciary bodies, carries out gross injustices such as random arrests, assault, torture, beatings, illegitimate detention, sexual assault and killing. At first glance it seems to cast a shadow over irrefutable evidence that the regime is indeed torturing many of its citizens, including the innocent. That is why we must remind ourselves of reality and attempt to answer that question: Why would the regime torture the innocent?

At the start of the new year, major think tanks in the United States' capital presented key policy recommendations to the American president. One of these recommendations was a policy memo that advised President Obama on how to address the potential radicalisation of the Muslim Brotherhood with respect to recent and ongoing political developments in Egypt.

How can we understand the recent statements made about Egypt by Iran’s assistant foreign minister? The recent statements issued by Iranian Assistant Foreign Minister for African and Arab Affairs Hossein Amir Abdollahian reflect a notable change in the Iranian position towards Egypt, after months of strained relations, when Iranians were being biased towards the Muslim Brotherhood after the June 30 Revolution.

Earlier this week, a bomb attack on an Egyptian tourist bus took place in Sinai, taking the lives of three South Korean tourists, and one Egyptian driver. More were wounded in the attack, which was claimed the following day by the Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis (ABM) group as part of an “economic war” against Egypt’s military-backed government. A line, it would appear, has been crossed. But will that change the perspective of anyone involved in Egypt’s sordid story? Or will it merely entrench them in their own worldviews?

In an interview two years ago, a French journalist asked me the tired question of whether the pitfall of the 25 January Revolution was the lack of a clear unifying leader. With exasperated breath, I explained to her that this was impossible for two very logical reasons: (1) If such a leader existed, he would have to be appealing to the Islamists, the MB, the communists, the liberals, the anarchists, the socialists (revolutionary and otherwise) and the reformists, which is impossible, and (2) It is incredibly unfair to demand that we find a leader when the whole world suffers from a leadership crisis. When she asked what I meant, I asked her if she considered either Sarkozy or Hollande to be her leaders, or if she knows any British person who believes in the leadership of David Cameron or an American that still considers Obama their leader. When she said “no” on all accounts, and asked me why that is, I simply responded: social media. Social media killed leadership.

Two decades after Israeli and Palestinian leaders signed an interim peace agreement in Washington, DC, the task of achieving a final resolution to the conflict has become significantly more difficult. Not only have the physical impediments to peace grown – for example, the number of Israeli settlers living on occupied Palestinian lands has increased three-fold to more than a half-million – but the political ground today is less fertile than it was back then.